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 Comparative  study  of  procedural  law  is  a  relatively  new 
phenomenon. While for more than a century comparativists have 
met to address  issues of  law comparatively,  their  focus  long was 
on rules of substantive law rather than on procedural law. Insofar 







to  traditional  tools  of  comparative  analysis  than  is  substantive 
law.  Isolating elements of procedural  law  is more difficult, while 
changing  elements  can  be more  politically  controversial.  Proce‐
dure  is  a  system. As  a  system,  each  element  is  interrelated;  one 
cannot  satisfactorily  examine  any  single  element  in  isolation 
without taking into account other elements.1  
                                                










for  such  studies.3  Meanwhile  Professors  Peter  Murray  and  Rolf 
Stürner published their  treatise on German civil  justice  in which 
they  include a comparison of  functions of American and German 
civil  procedure.4  Professor Oscar  Chase,  on  the  other  hand,  cau‐
tions  us  about  the  difficulties  of  comparative  studies  of  proce‐
dural law. “[C]ourt procedures,” he comments, “reflect the funda‐
mental values,  sensibilities and beliefs  (the  “culture”) of  the  col‐
lectivity that employs them.”5 For convenience sake, I refer to his 
point of view as culturalism.   
In  some  respects  functionalism  and  culturalism  are  two 
sides  of  the  same  coin:  functionalism  emphasizes  similarities 
among  systems  of  procedure,  while  culturalism  emphasizes  dif‐
ferences. More broadly  this  contrast  reflects a  long‐standing dif‐
ference  of  opinion  among  jurists  between  those who  see  law  as 
principally a  technical  tool  for organizing society and  those who 
see it as an historical development of the peoples’ consciousness.  
In the 19th century, that difference took the form of debates over 
codification.  In  the  21st  century,  it  is  taking  the  form  of  debates 
over possibilities for transplanting and harmonizing law. 
  Today I do not wish to debate the merits and demerits of 
either  functionalism  or  culturalism. My  talk  has  a more modest 
goal:  to  show  that  comparative  study  of  procedural  law  would 
benefit  from  closer  examination  of  legal methods.  It  is my—not 
very startling—contention that a legal system’s legal methods re‐
                                                
2  A  leading  proponent  is  KONRAD  ZWEIGERT  &  HEIN  KÖTZ,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW chap. 3 (Tony Weir, trans., 3rd ed. 1998). 
3 David J. Gerber, Comparing Procedural Systems: Toward and Analytical Frame­
work,  in LAW AND  JUSTICE  IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS  IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. 
VON MEHREN  665  (Arthur  Taylor  Von Mehren  and  Symeon  Symeonides,  eds., 
2002). 
4 PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). 





relationship  of  procedure  to  culture.  In  this  belief  I  follow Max 
Rheinstein, who wrote: 
 
  The  essential  difference  between  common 











American  systems,  I  believe  that  study  of  legal  methods  would 
inform almost any comparison of procedural law. 
I  plan  to  address  three  points:  I.  what  I  mean  by  legal 
methods  and  what  I  see  to  be  the  principal  difference  in  legal 
methods between the German and the American legal systems; II. 







First,  let  me  spell  out  what  I  mean  by  legal  methods.  In 
common  parlance  legal  methods  are  identified  with  interpreta‐
tion  of  statutes  and  of  precedents.7    Certainly  these  are  legal 
methods. I define legal methods more broadly. In my wider sense 
legal methods are devices used to apply abstract legal rules to fac‐








tual  situations  in  order  to  decide  concrete  cases.8  In  this  sense, 
legal methods  include methods  for creating as well as  for  imple‐
menting  legal  rules.9  Elsewhere  I  have  described  legal  methods 
under  three  rubrics:  lawmaking,  law­finding,  and  law­applying.10 
Lawmaking  is  legislation.  Law‐finding  encompasses  interpreta‐
tion  of  statutes  and  precedents.  Law‐applying  is  taking  those 
found rules and using them to decide concrete cases where facts 






German  legal methods norms,  i.e.,  legal  rules,  are  applied  to  the 
case at hand through subsuming facts under rules.11 While Ameri‐
can  legal methods  pursue  this  function  too,12  they  do  not  do  so 
with anywhere near the same attention as do the German.  
A brief  sketch of German  legal methods  suffices  to  estab‐
lish German devotion to norms. German lawmaking is careful and 
precise. We  think  first,  of  course,  of  the  German  Civil  Code:  the 
preeminent  exemplar  of  German  statutory  law.  While  Germans 
complain that today’s statutes and code revisions fall short of the 
standards  of  their  beloved  BGB,  German  statutes  are models  of 
clarity and consistency with other statutes, at  least as compared 
to  their  American  counterparts.  German  statutes  are  subject  to 
significant quality controls that are not present in the U.S. system. 
German  laws  originate  largely  within  responsible  ministries  of 
government.  They  are  drafted  by  professionals.  They  are  vetted 
by ministries of  justice responsible  for proofing them for consis‐
tency  with  constitution  and  legal  order.  They  are  approved  by 














tinkering.  It’s  not  just  codification  that  makes  a  difference  be‐
tween  American  and  German  law:  it’s  that  greater  attention  is 
given  to drafting norms  that are clear and consistent with other 
norms, easily found and readily applied.  
  German  statutes  usually  are  designed  well  to  be  applied 
easily. Well‐ordered, German norms are easily found. Responsibil‐
ity for their finding rests in the hands of the law appliers. Iura no­





responsible  for writing  judgments  that  demonstrate  that  norms 
are or are not fulfilled. German judgment‐writing technique dem‐
onstrates  German  devotion  to  norms:  it  validates  norm  applica‐
tion. Reinhard Zimmermann writes: “A German judgment is sup‐
posed  to  appear  as  an  act  of  an  impartial  as well  as  impersonal 
public  authority  furnishing  the  official  and  objective  interpreta‐
tion rather than being based on the personal opinions of  the de‐
ciding  justices.  …  The  typical  German  judgment,  like  its  French 
counterpart, strives after the ideal of deductive reasoning.”13  
  Compared  to  the  German  system,  the  contemporary 
American legal system shows norms relative indifference. Profes‐
sor  Stephen  Subrin  observes  that  in  American  procedure  “the 








in  procedure  has  been  questioned  and  alternative  models  pro‐
posed. A generation ago, Professor Lon Fuller asked, which comes 
                                                






cussed  competing  models  of  procedure  in  America.  The  tradi‐
tional model  he  calls  “the  accuracy model.”  It  “assumes  that  the 
aim of civil dispute resolution is a correct application of the law to 
the  facts.”16 This  is  reasonably  close  to  the models discussed by 
Murray,  Stürner  and Gerber.  But  that model  has  been  under  at‐
tack  in  the United States  for a half‐century.17 A more contempo‐
rary model Professor Solum calls: the “participation model.” It as‐
sumes,  that  “the  very  idea  of  a  correct  outcome must  be under‐
stood  as  a  function  of  a  process  that  guarantees  fair  and  equal 
participation.” According  to Professor Solun,  “[t]he key notion  is 


















lytical  tools.  The  legal  methods  that  a  legal  system  employees 
limit and channel its procedural law. Procedural law can only ac‐
complish  those  tasks  of  which  the  legal  methods  are  capable. 
Methods and procedures  that are  ill‐matched can operate along‐
                                                
15 Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 ( 1978). 

















Our  colleagues  already  see  significant  agreement  among 
“modern”  procedural  systems.  Professor  Chase  points  out  such 
systems  share  “reliance  on  formal  rules  of  law  as  applicable 
norms  and  reliance  on  sensory  evidence  as  a  source  of  fact.”19 
Professors Murray and Stürner observe that German and Ameri‐
can  systems  of  civil  procedure  both  seek  “the  fair,  accurate  and 





the  “primary  purpose”  of  civil  justice  is  “vindication  of  private 
rights.”21 For Professor Gerber, on the other hand, procedure is “a 
set of interrelated functions designed to foster the public purpose 
of  resolving private disputes.”22 The difference  is not merely  se‐
mantic.  




today.  Where  courts  come  first,  norms  recede  and  procedure 
achieves  primacy.  Justice  is  defined  as  procedural  justice.  This 
view  is  well‐represented  in  the  United  States;  it  may  even  be 
dominant. Emphasis on rules emphasizes the existing legal order, 








two parties. The  former  looks more  to  implementation of  a par‐
ticular  order,  while  the  latter  is  more  concerned  with  dispute 
resolution. 
2. My  second general question  is how we might best  talk 







with  those  functions  that procedural  law  fulfills within  the  legal 
system  as  a  whole.  They  discuss  the  different  goals  procedural 
law  is  designed  to  achieve.  Professor Gerber,  on other hand,  as‐
sumes  a  single,  primary  external  purpose.  He  then  identifies 
“components” that contribute to attaining that goal. 





ternal  functions.  The  theme  common  to  both  is  that,  whether 











they  distil  down  to  five  “functions”  for  comparing  between  the 
German  and  the  American  systems  of  civil  justice.  They  are:  “1. 








law;  [and] 7. Generating among  litigants and  the overall popula‐
tion  confidence  and  satisfaction  in  civil  justice  and  the  rule  of 
law.”24 They identify two other functions described as peculiar to 
the  American  system:  “public  regulation  of  economic  and  social 
actors” and “public education.”25 Their  list of  functions  is similar 
to that of Professor Subrin’s non‐exhaustive list of ten “values or 
goals American  procedure  serves.26    Comparative  legal methods 
tell  us  a  lot  about  these  functions,  their  evaluation and  their  re‐
spective weightings.  
Four  of  the  functions  identified  by  Professors Muray  and 
Stürner  are  litigant–focused:    “2.  Providing  litigants  with  high 
quality  determinations  of  fact  and  law;  3.  Guaranteeing  litigants 
procedural and systematic fairness; 4. Producing final enforceable 
decisions  without  undue  delay  and  at  reasonable  cost;  [and]  5. 
Affording  litigants  reasonably  free  access  to  justice.”  How  well 
these functions may be fulfilled is dependent on how well the re‐
spective  legal methods  are  able  to  achieve  them. Norm‐oriented 
methods may be better suited for carrying out some of these func‐
tions whereas process‐oriented methods may be better at others. 
The  other  three  functions  of  Professors  Murray  and 
Stürner  are  legal‐system‐focused:  1.  Maintaining  independence 
and  credibility  of  the  judicial  institution;  6.  Contributing  posi‐
tively to the development and explication of the law; [and] 7. Gen‐
erating among litigants and the overall population confidence and 
















the  law.”   Where  legislative norms are  the basis  of  decision,  the 
importance  of  norm‐development  in  procedure  should  be  less 
than  where  legislative  norms  are  less  important.  Similarly  the 
choice  of  legal  methods  may  determine  how  to  promote  inde‐
pendence  and  credibility  of  the  judiciary  and  how  to  generate 
overall population confidence and satisfaction in civil  justice and 






Professor  Gerber  is  concerned with  procedural  law  as  “a 
set of interrelated functions designed to foster the public purpose 
of resolving private disputes.”27 He takes this as the primary pur‐






  Here  too,  studies  of  comparative  legal  methods  have  an 
important  contribution  to  make.  Understanding  of  comparative 
legal methods  suggests  that  in  the  German  norm‐based  system, 
the preeminent goal is a judgment stating legal truth, while in the 
American process‐based system, the preeminent goal is the iconic 
“day‐in‐court.”    The  German  system  is  focused  on  establishing 
whether a norm is or  is not  fulfilled by found facts. The contem‐











                                                
27 Gerber, supra note 3, at 666. 
  Maxeiner: Legal Methods and Comparative Procedure, page 11 
  Culturalism  asserts  that  culture  determines  the  forms  of 
the  legal  system.  In  a  stronger  version  espoused  by  Professor 
Chase, general culture itself—and not just a specifically legal cul‐




of  Germans  as  rule‐oriented  and  Americans  as  free  individuals 
less‐constrained by rules. Did I not, after all,  just assert that Ger‐
man  methods  are  norm‐oriented  while  American  methods  are 








Professor  Chase  identifies  four  features  of American pro‐
cedure  that  he  considers  responsible  for  “American  procedural 
exceptionalism.” These are: “(i) the civil jury; (ii) the use of party‐








legal  methods  that  could  account  for  some  of  those  changes  in 
procedure and which could account for exceptionalism.  
In the last 160 years American legal methods have become 
progressively  less  norm‐oriented  even  as  American  society  has 
introduced many more norms. While Americans live in an age of 
statutes,  their  legal  methods  are  less‐oriented  toward  applying 
norms now than before. I think there is a case to be made that the 
forms of American exceptionalism that Professor Chase identifies 
followed,  rather  than preceded,  a  failure of more norm‐oriented 
legal methods. American  exceptionalism might  be  seen  less  as  a 









special  pleading,  restricted  to  deciding  a  single  factual  point  in 
issue.  Legal  historians  are  still  researching  the  extent  to  which 
those  controls  were  effective.  Nevertheless,  the  legal  system 
clearly  anticipated  close  control  over  the  law‐finding  and  law‐
applying role of the jury. The special pleading of the common law 
kept the civil  jury on a short  leash. Party‐directed discovery was 
practically  unknown. As  late  as when my  father  graduated  from 









formers  who  challenged  common  law  pleading  were  not,  how‐
ever,  adverse  to  legal  norms.  In  fact,  they believed  in  them. The 
same  reformers  who  sought  abolition  of  special  pleading,  also 
sought codification of substantive  law. But while  they succeeded 
in abolishing  special pleading and  replacing  it with  “code plead‐
ing,”  they were not successful  in codifying substantive  law. They 
did not replace it with a limited number of rationalized causes of 
action. Their attempts at codification failed repeatedly in the 19th 
century.  Did  the  triumphs  of  anti‐code  forces  reflect  American 
culture or the political clout of the professional bar? A case can be 
made  for  the  latter. The New York  legislature passed codes only 
to  see  the  governor  veto  them.  Similar  attempts  to  rationalize 










form  of  restatements.  The  story  is  a  complicated  one  and  there 
are no easy answers. My point is, however, that culture’s role, if it 
has one, might better be seen in the defeat of alternatives than in 
a  positive  selection  of  today’s  institutions.  The  legal  methods 







address  these  issues  in greater detail. Thank you  for your atten‐
tion. 
  
